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CALIBRATED COMMITMENT: THE LEGAL
TREATMENT OF MARRIAGE
AND COHABITATION
Milton C. Regan, jT.':'
INTRODUCTION

The rate of cohabitation without marriage has increased dramatically in Western countries over the past few decades. l Moreover, research suggests that cohabitation has become less of an "engagement"
that serves as a prelude to marriage and more of an intimate arrangement that may serve as an alternative to it.!! In other words, it is less
accurate than before to describe those who cohabit as simply involved
in a "trial" marriage.3 Many cohabitors instead regard living together
as a way to have an intiinate relationship that mayor may not result in
a decision to marry. This is reflected, for instance, in the declining

* Professor of law, Georgetown University law Center. My thanks to Professor
Donna Ruane Morrison of the Georgetown University Public Polic)' Institute, who
guided me through the social science literature on cohabitation and who offered
valuable comments on a draft of this Essay.
1 See PRINCIPLES OF TIlE LAw OF F.u.ULY DISSOLUTION: ANALySIS ,\ND RECO~t.~IE.''D.\.
TIONS § 6.03 Reporter's Notes, cmt. a (Tentative Draft No.4, 2000) [hereinafter ALI
PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft 2000)]; larry Bumpass & Hsien-Hen Lu, Trends in Cohabitation and Implications for Children:S Family Contexts in tlle United Slales, 54 POPULATIOS
STUD. 29, 29-30 (2000); Kathleen Kiernan, Cohabitation in Western Europe: Trends,
Issues and Implications 1 (Oct. 30, 2000) (unpublished manuscript presented at the
symposium, Just Living Together: Implications of Cohabitation for Childun, Families, and
Policy, at Pennsylvania State University (Oct. 30-31, 2000» (on file \\;th author).
2 See, e.g., Ronald R Rindfuss & Audrey VandenHeuvel, Cohabitalicm: A PT.-alTSor
to Marriage or an Alternative to Being Single?, 16 POPUL\TlON & DE\'. RE.... 703 passim
(1990); Pamela J. Smock & Sanjiv Gupta, Cohabitation in Contemporary North
America 25 (Oct. 30, 2000) (unpublished manuscript presented at the S)mposium.
Just Living Together: Implications of Cohabitation for Childrm, Families, alld Po!iC;i. at Pennsylvania State University (Oct. 30-31, 2000» (on file with author).
3 See Larry L Bumpass, Tire Changing SignificallCR ofMarriage in tile Ulliled Slaies. ill
THE CHANGING F.u.ULY IN CoMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE: AsIA AND THE UNITED ST,\TES 63.
7I (Karen Oppenheim Mason et al. cds., 1998) ("There is clear c\idcnce now ••• that
the probability of marrying following cohabitation is declining. as is the probability of
marrying a cohabiting partner.").
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percentage of cohabitors who eventually marry4 and in the fact that a
portion of the declining rate of marriage is due to the increasing rate
of cohabitation.5 In addition, the percentage of cohabitors who have
been together for three years or more has increased, 6 as well as the
percentage of cohabiting households in which children reside. 7
These trends raise the question whether American law should
more explicitly "institutionalize" cohabitation by ending the different
treatment of marital and non-marital relationships, thereby making
available to cohabitors a host of benefits currently available only to
those who are married. 8 There are signs that, to varying degrees, the
institutionalization of cohabitation already has begun. The most comprehensive example is the Scandanavian countries, where cohabitation arguably has come Closest to representing a widely-accepted
alternative to marriage. The law in these countries treats cohabitation
as virtually indistinguishable from marriage. 9 Similarly, in Canada,
the Modernization of Benefits and Obligations Act has eliminated federallegal distinctions between married couples and those who cohabit
for at least a year. lO As a result, "[t]he upshot is that all conjugal unions are now almost fully equivalent under Canadian federal law, the
remaining distinction being that married people do not have to live
together for a year for the benefits and obligations to apply to
them."ll
In the United States, Vermont has enacted legislation that treats
all same-sex couples who enter into a civil union the same as those
who are married, except for the former's inability to be formally married. 12 Less comprehensively, several municipalities and some states
have passed domestic partner provisions that extend selected benefits
to unmarried partners, or at least offer cohabitors the opportunity to
register as partners for the purpose of obtaining certain privileges
Smock & Gupta, supra note 2, at 15.
Larry L. Bumpass et aI., The Role of Cohahitatian in Declining Rates ofMarriage, 53
J. MAruuAGE & FA1>f. 913, 913 (1991).
6 Smock & Gupta, supra note 2, at 16; see also Michael Murphy, 17ze Evolutian of
Cohabitatian in Britain, 1960-95,54 POPULATION STUD. 43, 49-50 (2000).
7 Bumpass & Lu, supra note 1, at 29-30; Smock & Gupta, supra note 2, at 16.
8 On the concept ofinstitutionaIization, see LINDA]. WAITE, Cohabitatian: A Communitarian Perspective, in MAruuAGE IN AMERICA: A COMMUNITARIAN PERSPECTIVE 15-17
(Martin King Whyte ed., 2000); Steven L. Nock, A Comparisan of Marriages and Cohabiting Relationships, 16]. FAM. ISSUES 53, 55-74 (1995); Smock & Gupta, supra note 2, at
4
5

2l.
9 See EJ. GRAFF, WHAT Is MAruuAGE FoR? 52 (1999).
10 See Smock & Gupta, supra note 2, at 22.
11 Id.
12 SeeVT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1204(a) (Supp.2000).
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from public or private entities. IS Finally, the growth in the number of
courts that are willing to find a basis for honoring financial claims by
partners against one another at the dissolution of the relationship reflects increasing willingness to provide economic remedies similar to
those available to spouses who divorce. 14
On one view, full institutionalization is warranted because cohabitation and marriage involve substantially the same attitudes and orientation. The claim is that they differ only in the willingness of the
couple to go through the formality of marriage, which is an insufficient basis for distinguishing between them. Hi From this perspective,
cohabitation has become a more important relationship for persons
who desire intimate commitment but reject the need for formallegaI
recognition of this commitment. For these couples, "real" marriage is
a frame of mind, not the possession of a marriage certificate. Such a
view arguably harkens back to an earlier historical time, before church
and state found it in their interest to insist upon ceremonial formalities as the prerequisite for marriage. In that era, couples who lived
together "as man and vme" were regarded as married because of their

conduct, not because they had participated in a prescribed ritual.1 G
Some might maintain that modern cohabitors can be seen as inheritors of this tradition. The argument is that those who live together without marriage are just as committed as those who are
married, but they reject the baggage that goes along with that legal
status. Some research indicates, for instance, that those who cohabit
have more egalitarian views on gender roles than do spouses. 17 For
such couples, eschewing marriage may be a ,vay to reject the gender
assumptions that have been so prominent a feature of marriage as a
social institution.
An alternative argument for institutionalization is that respect for
individual privacy and autonomy mandates that the state not favor any
particular form of intimate relationship above others. If marriage is
losing favor because it meets the needs of fewer people, then the state
13 For an overview of such provisions, see ]ulianna S. Gonen, Sar1U:-Scx Unions and
Domestic Partnerships, 2 GEO.]. GENDER & L. 329 (2001).
14 See ALI PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft 2000), supra note I, § 6.03 Reporter's
Notes, cmt. h.
15 See GRAFF, supra note 9, at 209-15.
16 See id. at 193-95.
17 See Smock & Gupta, supra note 2, at 6 ("[C]ohabitation tends to be selective of
people who are slightly more liberal, less religious, and more supportive of egalit..man
gender roles and nontraditional family roles."); see also Marin Clarkberg et at., Alii-

tudes, Values, and Entrance into Cohabitation versus Marital Unions, 74 Soc. FORCES 609,
622-24 (1995).
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should not try artificially to prop it up by creating incentives for partners to enter into an arrangement that they othenvise would not
choose. On this view, the rise in cohabitation reflects the fact that
many partners now desire more individual independence, and less
commitment, as a part of their intimate relationships. IS Rather than
take the whole package of benefits and bur4ens that marriage provides, couples prefer to tailor the tenns of their relationships so they
reflect their own unique preferences. Cohabitation, thus, can accommodate the ,vide range of ,vishes about how people want to arrange
their personal lives better than marriage. Its growth reflects the
greater prominence of the ideals of individual autonomy and privacy
in intimate matters.
Are these arguments persuasive? Should legal trends continue so

that cohabitation and marriage ultimately receive virtually identical
legal recognition? On balance, I think that the answer is no. First, I
am skeptical that cohabitors are married in substance but simply not
in fonn. Research indicates ¢.at cohabiting relationships are less stable than marriages and that they generally reflect less commitment by
partners to one another.19 Second, law need not be agnostic among
types of intimate relationships. There are good reasons for law to promote marriage, because there are good reasons to promote intimate
commitment. Blurring the line between married and unmarried
couples would undennine the ability to express this preference.
At the same time, it seems inadvisable to proclaim a preference
for marriage by denying cohabitors all the legal privileges available to
spouses. Neither categorical extension nor denial of all marriage·like
benefits to cohabiting partners is appropriate. With respect to certain
issues, the state's desire to create incentives or express social values
may be outweighed by more important considerations. This means
that making decisions about the respects in which cohabitors should
enjoy legal treatment similar to spouses requires sensitivity to the interests at stake in each instance. In this Essay, I examine a variety of
benefits and suggest some general rules of thumb about when the legal claims of cohabitors should be honored as if made by spouses.
A couple of points are worth making at the outset of my argument. First, I speak in this Essay primarily about the extension of benefits to domestic partners, rather than the imposition of duties upon
them. That is because this has been the focus of most of the debate
about the legal treatment of married and unmarried couples. I read18

FRANCES K GoLDSCHNEIDER & LINDA].

WAITE, NEW FAMIUES, No FAMIUES? THI::
62-63 (1991).
See text accompanying infra notes 22-26.

TRANSFORMATION OF THE AMERICAN HOME

19
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ily acknowledge, however, that a fuller debate would consider not only
when domestic partners should be given rights, but also when they
should assume certain responsibilities. Indeed, as I will make clear,
one reason for rejecting certain claims by unmarried couples is that
they seek benefits comparable to those available to spouses without
corresponding obligations to which married partners are subject.20
Second, my focus is on the legal treatment of those who are married and those who have the option to marry but do not do so. As I
have argued elsewhere, I believe that marriage should be open to
partners in same-sex relationships.21 In the absence of this right to
marry, domestic partner legislation is a humane and pragmatic way to
recognize the commitment of many of these couples. For this reason,
asking how married and unmarried opposite-sex couples should be

treated in comparison to one another raises issues different from
those that deal with the relative treatment of opposite-sex and samesex couples. I concern myself in this Essay with the first question. but
also suggest how permitting same-sex couples to marry may in fact
strengthen, rather than weaken, the privileged position of marriage.
I.

MARruAGE,

COHABrrATION,

AND UNEQUAL TREATIoIE..'"

In this Part, I argue that married and unmarried partners should
not be accorded similar legal treatment because (1) marriage tends to
be a more enduring relationship than cohabitation, and (2) society is
justified in privileging marriage as a way of expressing the import...mce
of intimate commitment. Furthermore, I suggest, those who invoke
the value of private ordering to criticize preferential treatment for
marriage overlook the fact that in certain respects those who marry
have more latitude to arrange their relationships as they wish than
those who cohabit.
A.

Relative Stability and Commitment

The first reason for resisting full legal institutionalization of cohabitation is that evidence suggests that cohabitation is less stable
than marriage. Cohabitors break up at a higher rate than spouses divorce and live together for a briefer duration than married couples.22
Furthermore, even those cohabitors who eventually marry divorce at a
20
21

See text accompanying infra notes 100-10.
See Mrr.TON C. REGAN, JR., FAMILY L-\.w AND

THE PURSUIT OF Ir-.~MAC\'

119-22

(1993).

22 See Bumpass & Lu, supra note 1, at 33; Jay D. Tcachman ct aI., L£gal Sta/rts and
the Stability ofCoresidential Unions, 28 DEMOGRAPHY 571,583 (1991); W.\!TE, supra note
8.
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higher rate than spouses who never lived together before marriage. 2J
Some uncertainty exists about the extent to which these differences
reflect the fact that those who are less committed are attracted to cohabitation, as opposed to cohabitation itself shaping attitudes about
the desirability and feasibility of permanence and commitment in intimate relationships.24 In any event, it seems inaccurate to contend that
cohabitors .differ from spouses only in their unwillingness to clothe
their relationship with the formal status of marriage. Rather, unmarried partners generally are less committed to one another than are

spouses. 25 Furthermore, this commitment generally results in greater
well-being for spouses than for domestic partners. 26
Advocates of the view that cohabitation and marriage are substantively the same might claim that unmarried cohabitation simply represents the return of an historical social arrangement whereby a
couple's conduct, rather than its participation in a ceremony, was I'egarded as constituting marriage. 27 The rise of ceremonial marriage
occurred in the mid-sixteenth century as both state and church for
various reasons sought to exert more control over intimate relationships.28 One impetus for this phenomenon was urbanization and the
more frequent encounter with strangers. 29 When couples lived their
lives primarily in a relatively small community, their conduct alone
sufficed to communicate that others could treat them as an economic
and social unit. Those who needed to know individuals' marital status
knew it, which made a formal ceremony generally unimportant.
In the intervening five hundred years, formal marriage has taken
on powerful symbolic significance as a public expression of partners'
commitment to a shared intimate life with one another.30 For this
23 See William G. Axinn & Arland Thornton, The Relationship Between Cohabitation
and Divorce: Selectivity or Causal Influence?, 29 DEMOGRAPHY 357, 357-58 (1992): Lee A.
Lillard et aL, Premarital Cohabitation and Subsequent Marital Dissolution: A Malter of Sdf
Selection?, 32 DEMOGRAPHY 437, 438 (1995).
24 See Axinn & Thornton, supra note 23, at 358-72: Nock, supra note 8, at 54-55:
Smock & Gupta, supra note 2, at 8.
25 See Nock, supra note 8, 3,t 65-67:Judith Treas & Deirdre Giesen, Sexual Infidelity Among Married and Cohabiting Americans, 62 J. MAruuAGE & FAM. 48, 59 (2000);
WAITE, supra note 8.
26 WAITE, supra note 8.
27 See GRAFF, supra note 9, at 193-95.
28 See id. at 195-203.
29 See id. at 200.
30 This ascendance of a widely accepted companionate marriage in the last century and a half or so has been an important influence in promoting this understanding. See CAIu. N. DEGLER, AT ODDS: WOMEN AND THE FAMILY IN AMERICA FROM 'rHE
REvOLUTION TO THE PRESENT 8-25 (1980): KAREN LYSTRA, SEARCHING THE HEART: We.
<
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reason, the cultural meaning of cohabitation is different than it was
prior to the rise of ceremonial marriage. Given the current social significance. of marriage, it is reasonable to assume that those who live
together without marrying at least have reservations about making the
kind of commitment that a formal ceremony would express.
It may appear more plausible to claim that those who cohabit
want the substantive equivalent of marriage without the traditional
gender roles that are so closely associated with that institution. Partners' relative equality of earning power, for instance, enhances the
stability of cohabitation but reduces it for marriage.51 Nonetheless.
both cohabiting and married couples adopt a gendered division of
labor in which women perform more housework than men. although
the gap is narrower for unmarried partners.52 Thus, co-residence.
rather than formal marriage, seems to be what triggers an uneven allocation of domestic responsibilities.33
Furthermore, the last few decades have witnessed the dismantling
of the legal system that served formally to reinforce traditional gender
roles within marriage.34 This, of course, is not to deny that many
spouses continue to adhere to such roles out of custom and informal
expectations. Entry into the formal status of marriage, however, generally does not subject partners to a legal regime that promotes such
behavior, nor does avoidance of that status ensure that the relationship will be egalitarian. This 'is all the more true in light of the fact
that more cohabiting couples are having children togetller, since the
arrival of a child militates powerfully toward a traditional division of
labor withiil the household.35 As a result, it seems difficult to claim
that cohabiting couples represent committed partners who differ
from spouses only in their departure from conventional gender roles.
MEN, MEN, AND ROMANTIC LoVE IN NINETEENTH-CENroRY A>'IERlC:\

192-226 (1989);

ELAINE TYLER MAY, GREAT EXPEGrATIONS: MARRlACE AND DIVORCE IN POST'\'CTORL\'~

60-72 (1980).
SeeJulie Brines & KaraJoyner, Tile Ties Tilat Bind: Principles o/Collesion in Co/wllitatian and Marriage, 64 AM. Soc. REv. 333, 350 (1999).
32 See Sanjiv Gupta, The Effects 0/ Transitions in Marital Status on Men ~ Pt-rfonnan(e
of Housework, 61 J. MARRIAGE & FA1>I. 700, 707 (1999); Scott]. South & Glenna SpilZC.
HousewOTk in Marital and Nonmarital Households, 59 A>.f. Soc. lw:. 327, 327-44 (1994).
33 See Gupta, supra note 32, at 710.
34 See David L. Chambers, What Jf?: The ugal OJIISCqllfll({-S ofMarriage antI/he ugal
Needs oJLesbian and Gay Male Couples, 95 MICH. L. RE\'.447, 453-54 (1996); Milton C.
Regan,Jr., Marriage at tlle Millennium, 33 FA1>f. L.Q. 647,656 (1999).
35 "A recent swvey found that fully two-thirds of Americans believc it would bc
best for women to stay home and care for family and children." Jo,\.'-: WIL1.L\."IS, UNBENDING GENDER: WHY FA1>IILY AND WORK CoNFUGr AND WHAT TO Do AnOL'T IT 2
(2000).
AMERICA

31
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In sum, it appears unpersuasive to argue that full legal institution~
alization of cohabitation is warranted because cohabitors differ from
spouses only in the relatively trivial respect that they have failed to
obtain a marriage certificate. Cohabitors are not just people who are
married in substance but not in form. They generally are less commit~
ted, and their relationships are less stable, than those who are mar~
ried. If this difference is socially important, it is reasonable for the law
to treat couples who are married differently than those who are not.

B. Commitment and Private Ordering
Perhaps, however, comparable treatment of married and unmar~
ried couples should rest on another foundation: the claim that the
level of partners' intimate commitment should not be a matter of state
concern. Individuals may desire a range of different types of relationships, none of which should be favored by law. Having children may
provide greater justification for encouraging stable relationships, but
that concern applies regardless of the marital status of the couple. On
this view, comparable treatment of cohabiting and married couples
expresses respect for individual autonomy and privacy in the selection
of intimate partners. Indeed, cohabitation embodies the movement
toward greater private ordering in intimate life, in contrast with a
traditional status-based legal regime based on marriage.
1.

Commitment

The first response to this claim is that society has a legitimate
interest in promoting intimate commitment between adults, regard~
less of whether the relationship also involves children. I have made
this argument at greater length elsewhere and so will only briefly reca~
pitulate it here. 36
I begin with a powerful fundamental value of modem liberal soci~
ety: individual authenticity.37 Three concepts cluster around this
value. The first is what we might call self-fidelity: "to thine own self be
true," in Polonius's words. 3s Each of us has a unique identity and p~
36
POL'y

See Milton C. Regan,Jr., Law, Marriage, and Intimate Commitment, 9 VA.]. Soc.
& L. (forthcoming Fall 2001).

37 See generaUy ISAIAH BERLIN, THE ROOTS OF ROMANTICISM 139-43 (1999)
(describing the profound effect on modem Western culture of romanticism, for
which "the greatest virtue of all" is authenticity); CHARLES TAYLOR, THE ETHICS Of'
AUTHENTICnY (1991) (analyzing the implicit moral foundations of authenticity); Ll<J..
NEL TRILLING, SINCERITY AND AUTHENTICITY (1972) (tracing the evolution in Western
moral life from sincerity to authenticity as crucial value).

38

WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET

act 1, sc. 3.
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tential that we should strive to attain. 39 The second concept is autonomy, the idea that human beings can be self-governing. I am true to
myself when my life is shaped by my own wishes and values rather than
by the unreflective acceptance of others.40
Finally, individual authenticity involves integrit)'. This requires
that a person remain true to her principles or commitments in the
face of temptation to do otherwise. Integrity thus involves consistency. An individual needs to harmonize her values so that she can
live life without being constantly pulled in different directions. Further, she needs to be willing to act in accordance with those \'alues.41
Integrity is complementary to seU:fidelity and autonomy. A person
who tries to be true to herself values integrity, because it helps her
resist acting in a way that does not reflect her deep sense of self. An
autonomous person seeks to live with integrity, because it helps to harmonize her values into principles of self-governance.
Authenticity and the set of ideals that cluster around it require a
sense of the continuity and stability of the self over time. SeU:fidelity
requires a coherent self to whom one can be true. The aspiration to
autonomy assumes a self who can establish standards to govern her
behavior in a variety of circumstances, rather than one who is "radically situated"42 and moved only by immediate impulse. Finally, the
harmonization of values and of beliefs and behavior that characterizes
integrity implies a self that establishes limits on what she will do on the
ground that some conduct is inconsistent with who she is. Without
this stability, as Lynne Mcfall puts it, "there would be nothing to fear
the loss of, not because we are safe but because we have nothing to
lose."43 Self-fidelity, autonomy, and integrity thus contribute to a

sense of individual stability and are predicated upon its existence.
The ability to make and keep commitments is critical to the unity
of the self over time. Commitment reflects the intention to restrict
future possible courses of action for the sake of values that one regards as especially important. It means that one is not receptive in an
undifferentiated fashion to all possibilities available in all circum39 As Charles Taylor puts it, "Being true to myself means being true to my own
originality, and that is something only I can articulate and discover. In articulating it,
I am also defining myself. I am realizing a potentiality that is properly my O\m." TA\".
LOR, supra note 37, at 29.
40 For an account of the evolution of autonomy as a core "'estern concern, seeJ.
B. SCHNEEWIND, THE INvENTION OF AurONOMY (1998).
41 See generally Lynne McFall, Integrit)', 98 ETHICS 5, 6 (1987) (describing the importance of an authentic relationship to one's chosen principles).
42 MICHAEL]. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUST1CE 21 (1982).
43 McFall, supra note 41, at 20.
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stances, but is responsive to experience in terms of its significance for
what we care about. Indeed, commitments help bestow that significance, making possible the understanding of oneself as a unique protagonist in a coherent narrative that gives meaning to what othenvise
would be a series of discrete random events. Commitments thus are
what Lynne McFall calls "identity-conferring."44 As she puts it, "they
reflect what we take to be most important and so determine, to a large
extent, our [moral] identities."45 In this way, the foreclosure of possibility that commitment represents is the precondition of agency. The
adoption of constraints on action ironically makes possible a sense of
individual freedom.
Among our most profound commitments, of course, are those to
other people. In particular, romantic intimacy, at least in Western
contemporary society, is regarded as a relationship that engages identity in an especially deep way.46 The relationship between identity and
intimacy is expressed by Anthony Giddens, who notes the strong hold
of the idea of romantic love as "an odyssey, in which self-identity awaits
its validation from the discovery of the other."47 Because of this role
of intimacy in fostering authenticity, intimate commitment ertioys a
privileged status among the various kinds of commitments that we
may make. In sum, there is a powerful claim that society should promote commitment as a valuable good, because it is essential to realization of the deeply-rooted aspiration that individuals lead lives that
they can call their own.
Even if we accept a role for law in promoting intimate commitment, are we justified in privileging marriage as the form that such
commitment should take? One may argue that ivhat gives meaning to
intimate allegiances is not the assumption of a formal legal status, but
the personal choice to commit t9 another. If that is so, then law should
ratify the intimate choices that people make, married or unmarried,
rather than holding up one particular form of commitment as the
ideal.
Choice per se does not bestow value upon alternatives, however,
nor does it play any role in constructing an authentic identity. The
sense that the choices one makes have significance-that they matter-depends on the existence of a social background that designates
what is ofvalue. 48 These values are diverse and sometimes incommen44
45

Id.
Id.

at

13.
66 (1994).

46

See IRVING

47

ANTHONY GIDDENS, THE TRANSFORMATION OF INTIMACY: SEXUALllY, LOVE AND

SINGER, THE PURSUIT OF LoVE

EROTICISM IN MODERN SOCIETIES

48

45 (1992).
at 37.

See TAYLOR, supra note 37,
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surable. A person's choices among them have implications for her
identity, because they reflect her own distinctive evaluation, ordering,
and attempted reconciliation of values that she regards as having independent value. Making difficult choices is character-forming, because
it represents confrontation 'with the pull of obligations whose force we
cannot control solely by ourselves. By contrast, a person for whom
things assume value simply by virtue of her own fiat could always dissolve any dilemma merely by proclaiming that one of the alternatives
no longer possesses any significance.
For intimate commitment to be constitutive of identity thus requires that it be seen as something that derives its value from a source
outside the self's choice to engage in it.49 It requires, in other words,
social validation. The legal institution of marriage plays an especially
significant role in providing such validation for the value of commitment. It bestows a legal status on partners that is the basis for impersonal rights and obligations. Those who marry participate in a public
ritual that marks entry into a social institution that is intended to embody the value of intimate commitment That institution transcends

any specific couple who may be a part of it and has a history that
dwarfs any couple's particular ex-perience. Marriage is not static; understandings of the proper role of wives, for instance, have shifted
dramatically over the past generation and are still the focus of contention. 50 Nonetheless, marriage offers a reasonably coherent set of expectations and traditions about commitment that aids in the
construction of a narrative identity both for each partner and for the
couple together. Indeed, this role of marriage is reflected in the fact
that many gay and lesbian critics argue that denying same-sex couples
the right to marry is injurious, precisely because it deprives such
couples of this social acknowledgment of the value of their intimate
commitments.51
The first response to the claim that respect for private ordering of
intimate relationships justifies legal institutionalization of cohabita49 See STEPHEN L. DARWAU., IMPARTIAL RE,\sON 165 (1983) ("That which endows
our life with meaning must be something whose value we regard as self.transcendent."); see also JEFFREY BLUSTEIN, CARE AND CoMMITMENT 42-60 (1991) (discussing
the importance of impersonal value to the significance of what we care about).
50 See generally WIU.IAMS, supra note 35 (arguing that the models of"idcal worker"
and "marginalized caregiver" prevent both men and women from ex-periencing work
and family as they would like).
51 See, e.g., BarbaraJ. Cox, But Why Not Marriage? An Essay Qn l'mncmt:S Civil Unions Law, Same-Sex Marriage, and Separate But (Un)Equal, 25 VT. L. RE\'. 113. 136-47
(2000).
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tion, therefore, is rhat society is justified in promoting commitment by
favoring marriage.
2. Private Ordering
The second response is that the private ordering that cohabitation involves increasingly has been eroded in several respects. For
some purposes, cohabitation has taken on the character of a status,
while marriage provides greater opportunity for couples to arrange
their lives as they wish. Cohabitors who wish to make financial claims
on their partner when their relationship ends, or to receive certain
benefits as a family member of their partner, generally must convince
a court that their relationship is or was the substantive equivalent of
marriage. 52 Courts, as a fonnal matter, tend to frame the inquiry in
cases involving financial awards as whether a contract between the
parties gave rise to the expectation of such assistance.l'3 As the ALI
project on family dissolution has observed, however, many courts
appear to vindicate an equitable rather than a contractual principle.
That is, having concluded that a particular set of facts demands a
remedy, they may stretch ordinary contract principles to fit the remedy within a contractual rubric. This result is not surprising. Parties
may share their lives for many years without having any clear agreement, express or implied, that sets out the financial consequences
that would follow from the decision by one of them to terminate
their relationship. To find such an agreement may therefore require filling many gaps with terms that follow more from the court's
sense of fairness than from any mutual intentions inferable from
the parties' conduct.54

In short, the law tends to treat cohabitation between intimate
partners as akin to a status. That is, persons who live together in a
relationship that involves financial and emotional interdependency
are given rights and are subject to obligations by operation of law,
even in the absence of explicit consent by the partners.
• The ALI proposal suggests that the law in this area should explicitly acknowledge its reliance on status, so that "property claims and
support obligations presumptively arise between persons who qualify
as domestic partners, as they do between legal spouses .... "55 The
detennination whether an unmarried couple is a domestic partnership depends on whether the couple "for a significant period of time
52
53
54
55

See infra text accompanying notes 62-68.
See, e.g., Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106, 112-13 (Cal. 1976).
ALI PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft 2000), supra note 1, § 6.03 cmt. h.
Id.
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share[d] a primary residence and a life together as a couple."56
Whether they are deemed to have shared a life together must be determined "by reference to all the circumstances,"j7 which includes
consideration of thirteen different factors.!iS
Conceptualizing cohabitation as a status reflects two ways in
which private ordering has become circumscribed for nonmarital
partners. First, an individual cannot avoid a financial obligation to his
or her partner simply by avoiding marriage. The presumption is that
domestic partners have aSsumed certain responsibilities toward one
another, which will be imposed unless ex-plicitly disavowed. By contrast, at the time Marvin v..Marvirf>9 was decided, the presumption was
that unmarried partners had no obligations toward one another, unless they had affirmatively embraced them. 60 Only spouses were assumed to have agreed to financial sharing.61 The default rule for
cohabitors, in other words, now tends to mirror the rule that governs
spouses. As a result, the absence of formal legal status does not neCessarily mean the absence of de facto status.
Second, in order to bring a claim successfully, a partner must establish that the cohabitation was the substantive equivalent of marriage. This requires that unmarried couples conform to conventional
cultural norms about appropriate marital behavior. Thus, for instance, factors that the ALI regards as relevant in determining
whether individuals "shared a life together as a couple" include considerations such as "the extent to which the parties intermingled their
finances,"62 "[t]he extent to which their relationship fostered the parties' economic interdependence, or the economic dependence of one
party upon the other,"63 "[t]he extent to which the parties engaged in
conduct and assumed specialized or collaborative roles in furtherance
of their life together,"64 and "[t]he emotional or physical intimacy of
the parties' relationship. "65
Similarly, the New York Court of Appeals, in Braschi v. StahlA.ssodates CO.,66 concluded that a same-sex partner should be considered a
56

57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66

[d. § 6.03(1).
[d. § 6.03(7).
[d. § 6.03(7) (a)-(ro).

557 P.2d 106 (Cal. 1976).
[d. at 116.
See id. at 118.
ALI PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft 2000), supra note I, § 6.03(7)(b).
[d. § 6.03(7) (c).
[d. § 6.03(7)(d).
[d. § 6.03(7) (h).
543 N.E.2d 49 (N.Y. 1989).
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"family member" of the deceased and therefore entitled to remain in
the latter's rent-controIled apartment, because the couple lived in a
household "having all of the normal familial characteristics."67 In
general, the court said, such characteristics include "the exclusivity
and longevity of the relationship, the level of emotional and financial
commitment, the manner in which the parties have conducted their
everyday lives and held themselves out to society, and the reliance
placed upon one another for daily family services."68
By contrast, those who are married may organize their lives as
they vvish and still automatically receive the benefits (and incur the
obligations) associated with that status. A husband can, for instance,
work in another city during the week and reside with his wife only on
the weekends and still be treated as a spouse. A married couple may
maintain strictly separate financial accounts, or not practice sexual ex~
c1usivity, and will still be regarded as married for legal purposes. Un~
married cohabitors, therefore, generally must live consistently with
main~tream understandings of appropriate marital behavior in order
to receive certain legal benefits. By contrast, those who formally as~
sume marital status have the freedom to arrange their intimate lives as
they wish without fear of jeopardizing the benefits flowing from
marriage.
Married parents enjoy similar latitude in their enjoyment of parental benefits. An unmarried biological father seeking custody of or
visitation with a child, for instance, or a voice in the decision to place
the child with an adoptive family, must demonstrate that he has consistently maintained a meaningful relationship with the child in order
to assert any legal right that attaches to parenthood. 69 A father mar~
ried to his child's mother, however, is automatically entitled at divorce
to consideration for custody and visitation rights, and his consent
must be obtained prior to the adoption of the child. 70 This is so re~
gardless of whether he has had meaningful involvement in his child's
life (unless his lack of involvement is so egregious that he is deemed
to' have abandoned the child).71
Law, therefore, should be free to favor marriage over cohabitation and should not blur the distinction between the two kinds of relationships. Does that mean that unmarried couples should receive
none of the benefits available to spouses? Should the desire to avoid
67 fa. at 54.
68 fa. at 55 (citations omitted).
69 Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 266-67 (1983).
70 MARGARET M. MAHONEY, STEPFAMIUES AND THE LAw 163-64 (1994).
71 See, e.g., Ex parte C.V., No. 1981316, 2000 WL 1717011 (Ala. Nov. 17, 2000).
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eroding allegiance to marriage lead to rejection of any claims by unmarried partners that are not based on ex-plicit contractual
agreement?
II.

QUALIFIED RECOGNITION

Categorical denial of claims by domestic partners seems no less
problematic than eliminating the distinction between married and unmarried couples. There may be reasons for recognizing claims by unmarried partners that on balance are weightier than the fear that
doing so may lessen the distinctive status of marriage. We need to
think carefully about the rationales for the extension or denial of
comparable legal treatment of cohabitation and marriage, focusing
on both the practical and symbolic significance of such treatment in
particular situations.72
Before addressing some of the specific benefits that should be
subject to this analysis, we need to think about what criteria should
guide our deliberation. I propose the following. In general, we
should acknowledge claims when failing to do so risks leaving one
partner in an interdependent relationship seriously vulnerable or disadvantaged because of her reliance on the other, particularly when
the relationship has ended. We also should recognize legal rights
when the party. seeking those rights 'wishes to use them to assume responsibility for the care of his or her partner.. In addition, we should
extend legal protection to children who othenvise might be injured by
the law's denial of parental rights and benefits based on the absence
of marital status. At the same time, we reasonably may prefer married
couples over unmarried ones with respect to matters such as adoption
and foster care. This is justified because of the greater stability of married as opposed to unmarried couples and the absence of a partner's
preexisting relationship 'with a child.
Furthennore, we generally should be skeptical about comparable
legal treatment of married and unmarried couples wh.en denial of
benefits to the latter would not impose hardship on a partner who has
become vulnerable by virtue of her reliance on the relationship. In
some cases, for instance, unmarried partners seek to be treated as
spouses, because this would provide them with benefits on more advantageous terms than othenvise are available. The fact that they are
unwilling to assume the responsibilities and burdens that are imposed
on couples who marry, however, weighs against recognizing their
claims. This is because these couples represent less than the full com72 My discussion in this Pan focuses on many of the legal benefits described in
Chambers, supra note 34, at 452-85, and Bakr v. Stale, 744 A.2d 864, 884 (Vt. 1999).
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mitmeIl-t, for better or worse, that marriage is meant to involve. Fi..
nally, we may want to reject claims by unmarried partners when
extension of a right currently reserved to spouses would leave uncertainty about who is entitled to the right and would create potential for
its abuse.
These are broad guidelines, which serve only as provisional rules
of thumb. They underscore, however, that, ceteris paribus, law should
be most willing to extend legal recognition of or protection for cohabitation when doing so reinforces an ethic of care and commitment in
intimate relationships. What are the implications of this approach for
specific issues relating to the legal treatment of cohabitation? The
discussion that follows offers some answers to this question. My intention is not to offer a definitive resolution of these issues, but to suggest
how we might go about identifying and weighing the considerations
that are relevant with respect to particular claims by domestic
partners.
A.

Inter Se Claims

Consider the first category of cases, which involves claims by one
partner against another. The most significant of these deals with the
allocation of property and financial support between the partners. If
a claimant can establish that the relationship involved financial and
emotional interdependence, the law should recognize that the vulnerability and reliance that necessarily result in such cases militate toward
recognition of the claim. As a practical matter, given the substantial
number of persons who cohabit at one time or another, refusal to
recognize a cause of action could inflict significant hardship upon a
considerable number of people. Many of them are likely to be women, because they are the ones in unmarried relationships who tend
to make more financial sacrifices and are less able to convince their
partners to marry.73 As a symbolic matter, declining to recognize
claims would send the message that by refusing to marry one can escape the responsibilities that flow from intimate relationships. While I
have acknowledged that it is legitimate for law to take into account the
legal form of a relationship in assigning rights and benefits, denying
financial claims between unmarried partners would elevate form over
substance to an unacceptable degree.
Related to that point, the ALI is right to suggest that the basis for
recovery in these instances should be the fact that persons have lived
together as domestic partners, rather than express or even implicit
73 See Grace Ganz Blumberg, Cohabitation Without Marriage: A Different Pmpectivl',
28 UCLA L. REv. 1125, 1163, 1168-69 (1981).
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contract theory.74 The important consideration is that individuals
may have responsibilities of care toward one another that arise not
simply from consent but by virtue of a shared life. whatever legal form
it takes. Even if relying on contract doctrine may produce a similar
result in most cases, the rhetoric of that doctrine is resolutely individualist rather than relational. By contrast, to base recovery on what the
ALI calls a "status classification"75 reflects "the familiar principle that
legal rights and obligations may arise from the conduct of parties , ..ith
respect to one another, even though they have created no formal document or agreement setting forth such an undertaking. "76
Another instance requiring us to decide whether law should
honor the claim of one unmarried partner against the other arises
when one of the partners dies. When a spouse dies without prO\iding
in his will for any inheritance for his spouse. most states authorize the
surviving spouse to claim a "forced" share of the estate. ranging from
one-third to one-half.77 No such provision benefits a similarly situated
surviving unmarried partner. Should it? Answering this question is a
bit more complicated than addressing the issue of financial awards
upon dissolution of the relationship. On the one hand, if the partners had a common financial and emotional life together, the survivor
likely would expect to share some or all of the estate in case of the
other person's death. Indeed, she may well have made sacrifices that
enhanced the value of that estate. As I have suggested, if the couple
separated by choice, she should be entitled to an equitable share of
the available assets. Why should it be any different if they separate by
death? '
On the other hand, unlike the case of ordinary separation, the
deceased partner has not attempted to withhold benefits from his
partner for the purpose of maximizing his own wealth. He has instead
established certain priorities among those persons with whom he feels
some emotional bond. The exclusion of his partner from the ,\ill suggests that the relationship perhaps was not as emotionally significant
as the claimant may eventually suggest. There is more reason to regard this exclusion as a genuine expression of the relative importance
of the relationship to the deceased than to give credence to how a
relationship is described by a partner who is seeking to minimize his
duties at the time a couple separates. Furthermore, the other partner
may be on notice of his choice, which means that she could not rea74
75
76
77

See ALI PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft 2000), supra note I, § 6.03 emt. b.

fa.
fd. § 6.02 cmt. a.

See Chambers, supra note 34, at 479.
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sonably expect to share in the estate in the event of death. If she is
not aware of the choice, that itself may be a telling commentary on
the nature of the relationship.
Arguments based on the need to vindicate an ethic of care arising
from interdependence thus seem less compelling in this case than
'with respect to financial awards upon dissolution. The most persuasive rationale for extending the benefit to an unmarried partner is the
avoidance of undue financial hardship. This suggests, perhaps, that a
qualified domestic partner be entitled to a forced share only upon a
showing that failure to honor the claim would impose undue hardship. Thus, the standard would be similar to that required under the
Uniform Premarital Agreement Act for declining to enforce the terms
of a premarital contract that modify or eliminate spousal support. 78
How should we respond when the question is whether an unmarried partner should be given any share of the estate by statute when
her partner dies without a wil1?79 In this case, we obviously have no
indication by the deceased that he did not wish to prevent his partner
from being able to inherit from him. The mere failure to prepare a
will, by itself, does not necessarily give rise to such an inference, since
it is not uncommon for people to put off the preparation of a will. An
important purpose of an intestacy statute is to reflect the deceased's
likely wishes regarding the disposition of his or her estate, based on
assumptions about the relative importance of various relationships in
his or her life. If a person can establish that she was a domestic partner, it seeI?s reasonable to assume that the deceased would have given
her preference in his will had he made his wishes explicit.
A countervailing consideration is that an intestacy statute also expresses society's views about the value of various relationships and
that, as I have suggested, there is reason to give priority to marriage
among intimate relationships. If two persons who are romantic companions choose not to marry, one may argue that if they want to inherit from each other, they should make their wishes explicit in a will.
In addition, one could anticipate that opening the door to claims by
unmarried partners might generate numerous disputes among those
asserting entitlement to a portion of the estate. The arguments surrounding this issue make resolving it more difficult than when a partner has deliberately chosen to exclude the other partner from her
will. On balance, it seems fairer to recognize that many people fail to
make or to change a will and that a domestic partner who has shared a
78 UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT Acr § 6(b), 9B U.L.A. 376 (1987).
79 For a description of benefits made available to spouses in such circumstances,
see Chambers, supra note 34, at 455-56.
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life with the deceased should not be penalized for her companion's
failure.

B. Assuming Responsibility
A second category of cases are those in which one member of an
unmarried couple seeks the opportunity to assume responsibility for
decisions relating to care of the other. Laws designate, for instance,
. those who are authorized to make medical decisions for someone
when she becomes incompetent and who may make decisions in that
situation with respect to matters such as choice of residence and financial transactions. 80 If a party has not indicated who should exercise authority in these cases, statutes typically look first to a spouse and
then to blood relatives to take on this role.Sl If a domestic partner is
willing to accept responsibility for making such decisions, the authority to do so is not so much a benefit that an unmarried companion
seeks to obtain as it is a burden that she is willing to bear. Permitting
her to do so would acknowledge the importance of care and commitment in intimate relationships, which is the value that underlies a general preference for marriage.
Furthermore, as David Chambers has observed, the rationale for
vesting decisionmaking power in a spouse is that this individual is
"more likely than any other person to know what decisions the incompetent person would have made if she were now able to decide for
herself or, alternatively, at least to be the person most concerned
about the incompetent person's welfare."82 That is, a major concern
in these cases is accuracy: the decisions made should most closely approximate those the incompetent person would make based on familiarity with her values and wishes. For these reasons, it seems
appropriate to leave open the possibility that a person who establishes
that she is a domestic partner of the incompetent person will be able
to make decisions on his behalf.
A related issue is the ability to take leave to care for an ill partner
under the Family and Medical Leave Act.83 The Act requires that certain employers grant unpaid leave for up to twelve work weeks a year
to employees to care for a spouse, parent, or child with a "serious
health condition. "84 It provides for no leave, however, to care for an
unmarried partner. Should it? As with the desire to assume decision-

80 See UNIF. PROBATE CoDE §§ 5-305 (c) , 5-409 (a) , 8 U.LA 466, 487-88 (1983).
81 See Chambers, supra note 34, at 455.
82 [d. at 456.
83 See 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654 (1994).
84 Id. §§ 2611-2654, 2612(a)(1)(c) (1994).
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making responsibility for an incompetent partner, there is a good ar~
gument that seeking to obtain this benefit reflects a willingness to take
on the burdens that flow from intimate commitment to another per~
son. This willingness, along with the likelihood that the ill person may
have no caregiver more attentive and faithful than her domestic part~
ner, militates in favor of amending the Act to include the provision of
care for an unmarried partner as a basis for leave.
C.

Children

A third category of cases in which the issue of comparable treat~
ment of married and unmarried persons arises deals with relationships in which there are children. A person married to someone with
a child not from the marriage is regarded by the law as a stepparent.
He does not have the full panoply of parental rights unless he adopts
the child,85 but in some cases stepparent status is the basis for benefits
flowing to him or to the child. The Family and Medical Leave Act, for
instance, pennits a worker to take leave to care for a stepchild. 86
Should it enable an unmarried partner to take leave to care for the
child of a companion? There is a good argument that if the adult is
willing to assume the responsibility for providing such care, the law
should encourage this by enabling him or her to take leave under the
Act for this purpose. Another example of parental rights and responsibilities flowing from marriage involves the use of reproductive technology. When a husband consents to the insemination of his wife,
that consent alone is sufficient for the law to treat him as the resulting
child's father, even though he has no biological relationship to it. s7
By contrast, an unmarried male who consents to his partner's insemination in these circumstances does not thereby attain this status. S8
His consent, however, reflects a willingness not only to receive the
benefits of legal parenthood, but also to assume its significant responsibilities and burdens. Granting rights and imposing obligations in
this setting would acknowledge the importance of this attitude in promoting the welfare of children.
In other instances, directly promoting the welfare of the child
seems a good reason for according comparable treatment to married
and unmarried partners. State workers compensation and federal Social Security survivors benefit law, for instance, provide that a minor
85 See generally MAHONEY, supra note 70, at 161 ("The process of adoption creates
the full parent-child status between the adopting stepparent and the stepchild.").
86 29 U.S.C. §§ 2611(12), 2612(a)-(d) (1994).
87 See, e.g., In re Marriage of Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280, 291 (Ct. App. 1998).
88 See Dunkin v. Boskey, 98 Cal. Rptr. 2d 44, 55 (Ct. App. 2000).
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stepchild living with and dependent upon a stepparent is eligible to
receive benefits to replace lost income resulting from the stepparent's
death. 89 The child's eligibility, in other words, depends upon the relationship between the adults. If, however, a child must establish actual
prior economic dependency upon an adult resident of the household
in order to receive benefits, there seems no reason to permit recovery
if the child is dependent upon an adult married to her parent but to
deny it if the adult is not. Even if we consider it appropriate to express society's preference for marriage through different treatment of
married and unmarried couples, we should not compromise children's welfare as the price for doing so in this situation. If an adult
partner has assumed the responsibility of helping support a child and
the child has relied on that support, the vulnerability that results from
the adult's death supports recognizing a child's claim for benefits to
replace the lost income.
Similarly, if an unmarried partner has developed an attachment

to and relationship with a child living in the household, it genernlly is
in the child's interest that this partner be eligible to maintain that
relationship through visitation with the child if the adults separate.
Yet, in many states, a cohabitor has no standing to present such a
claim.90 The traditional rule has been that any person not a biological
or legal parent of a child could not intervene in custody or ,isitation
matters at divorce without a showing that the parent was unfit.91 This
approach disadvantages both married partners-that is, stepparentsand cohabitors.
In recent years, several states have explicitly authorized stepparents to present claims in custody and visitation proceedings at the
time of divorce.92 It is far less common, however, for unmarried partners to have standing to do so when the adults' relationship ends. If,
however, the partner has a significant relationship with the child, it
seems unreasonable to base his ability to pursue continued contact
with the child on whether he has been married to the child's mother.
The ALI rejects reliance on marital status as the basis for determining standing in these situations. Section 2.04 of its Principles of the
Law ofFamily Dissqlution provides for notice and right of participation
in custodial responsibility proceedings for both a legal parent and a
"de facto parent. "93 The latter is defined as someone who for a signifi89 Chambers, supra note 34, at 464.
90 See MAHONEY, supra note 70, at 129-37.
91 See, e.g., Petersen v. Rogers, 445 S.E.2d 901, 905-06 (N.C. 1994).
92 See ALI PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft 2000), supra note I, § 2.0·1 Reporter's
Notes, cmt. d (discussing cases under this principle).
93 Id. § 2.04(l)(c).
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cant period has resided with the child and, with the legal parent's
consent, has performed at least as much of the caretaking functions
for the child as has the legal parent. 94 The relative weight that a legal
and a de facto parent's interest should receive is subject to some disagreement and warrants more elaborate discussion than I can provide
here. The important point for my purposes is that, however the balance is struck, it seems inappropriate that only stepparents are eligible
for de facto parent status and that everyone else is categorically excluded. The interest of the child in continuing the relationship with
the de facto parent should at least be taken into account, whatever the
de facto parent's relationship with the legal parent. An unmarried
cohabitor who is willing to sustain that relationship and the responsibilities that it entails should receive a hearing when he and his partner
agree to separate.
There are other issues dealing with children, however, where it is
reasonable to distinguish between married and unmarried partners.
Stepparents in most states are able to adopt a child of their spouse
without home visits and family studies that typically are required
before an adoption is approved. 95 On one hand, the willingness of a
cohabitor to adopt reflects a commendable desire to provide the care
and to take on the considerable obligations that accompany legal
parenthood. On the other hand, however, there is a higher likelihood that a cohabiting couple will separate than there is that a married couple wm divorce. 96 This warrants a closer look at the
household before a partner is permitted to adopt. Bestowing adoptive
parenthood on an unmarried partner could make any dissolution process more contentious, because each partner would have comparable
rights in a custody and visitation proceeding. By contrast, even if a
cohabitor is able to assert de facto parent status, the legal parent still is
given certain preferences that simplify the determination of custodial
rights and responsibilities. 97 In general, this should produce more
predictability and less conflict, which is in the interest of children.
Such a consideration is of particular concern for children in households with unmarried partners because of the greater risk of disruption than exists for children in marital households. The home visit
and family study ultimately may preclude few cohabitors from adopting, but it a££:ords an opportunity to make a more detailed assessment
94 Id. § 2.03(1) (c).
95 SeeJoan H. Hollinger, Introduction to ADOPTION LAw AND PRACfICE § 1.05[2] Ea]
Uoan H. Hollinger ed., 1988).
96 See supra text accompanying notes 22-23.
97 For instance, a nonparent typically can obtain custody of a child only if the
natural or legal parent is deemed unfit. See MAHONEY, supra note 70, at 140-41."
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of the likely stability of the setting in which the partners plan to raise
the child.
The greater stability of married couples provides even greater justification for favoring them in adoption and foster care selections.93
In these instances, there is no pre-existing relationship between partner and child that needs to be taken into account. Here again. the
desire of an unmarried couple to assume responsibility for a child
through adoption or serving as foster parents is laudable. and such
couples will still have opportunities to do so. 'When a suitable married
couple is also available, however. the willingness of the spouses to
make a public commitment to one another and the comparative data
on stability99 militate toward favoring the married over the unmarried
couple.

D. SPecial Benefits
Distinguishing between spouses and cohabitors also seems appropriate in cases in which cohabitors seek treatment as a married couple
simply to obtain benefits othenvise unavailable or on more advantageous terms. In such instances, partners seek the benefits of marital
status without its corresponding obligations. There are a variety of
burdens to which married couples are subject, but unmarried ones
generally are not. If spouses apply for certain government benefits.
such as Supplemental Security Income or welfare, the grant is lower
than if each partner had applied separately.IOO In many cases. if only
one spouse applies for a needs-based benefit, the income of the other
is attributed to him or her. 10l A spouse has the legal duty to pay for
necessaries, such as emergency medical care, provided to her partner
by third parties,102 but a cohabitor does not. In most community
property states, a creditor can collect a debt from a married couple's
community property, without regard to the contribution of that
spouse to acquisition of the property.103 In addition, spouses are subject to anti-nepotism provisions, while cohabitors generally are not. I1H
Married couples must comply with divorce law in order to end their
relationship, but unmarried couples may separate on their own. In
these and other 'ways, marriage involves obligations that cohabitation
98 On such a preference, see Chambers, supra note 34, at 469-70, and dt..ltions
therein.
99 See supra text accompanying notes 22-26.
100 See Chambers, supra note 34, at 473-74 (dting 42 U.S.C. § 1382 (1991».
101 Id.
102 Id. at 484-85.
103 See id. at 485.
104 See id. at 460.
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does not. For that reason, in the absence of other countervailing considerations, unmarried partners should not necessarily be accorded
the advantages of marriage.
Thus, for instance, a gift from one spouse to another is exempt
from the federal gift tax. 105 Cohabitors could obtain this benefit
through marriage, but have declined to do so. The law should take
them at their word that they do not wish to enter into the kind of
formal public commitment that marriage entails and should be able
to deny them this benefit of making such a commitment. It is unlikely
that unmarried partners have arranged their lives in expectation of
such a benefit and that either would be significantly disadvantaged
because of reliance on its anticipated availability.
Similarly, public and private employers make health care benefits
available to spouses of employees,106 and a few states now require certain employers to extend health insurance to the othenvise uninsured
spouses of employees. I07 These spousal benefits are exempt from taxation. IOS Cohabitors asserting a claim to such benefits seek to invoke
their relationship as a source of individual advantage, while using
their unmarried status to avoid the burdens of marriage. Admittedly,
a valid consideration in these instances is the importance of ,videspread availability of health insurance. In many cases, however, the
issue is not the absolute availability of health insurance, but the ability
to obtain it on more advantageous terms. Furthermore, it may well be
appropriate in providing health insurance to shift emphasis away from
membership in an intimate relationship to access to insurance on an
individual basis. Reform efforts should focus directly on this change,
however, rather than on the comparable treatment of individuals in
relationships that generally feature different levels of commitment.
Additional policy considerations are relevant in deciding whether
to extend benefits to both married and unmarried couples in other
cases. For instance, a foreign national who marries an American citizen has a presumptive right to enter the United States immediately as
a long-term resident. 109 Should one who cohabits ,vith an American
citizen be entitled to the same treatment? Concerns about the integrity of immigration law add weight to the refusal to do so. Even under
existing law, there is potential for abuse of this provision through a
"sham" marriage into which parties enter solely for the purpose of
105
106
107

108
109

See I.R.C. §§ 1041, 2523 (1994).
See Chambers, supra note 34, at 474.
Id. at 484 (citing HAw. REv. STAT. §§ 87-4, 393-7, 393-21 (1993».
Id. at 474 (citing I.R.C. §§ 105, 213 (1996».
See 3 CHARLES GORDON ET AL., IMMIGRATION LAw AND PROCEDURE § 36.02 (rev.

ed. 2000).
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obtaining favorable immigration status. Such marriages will not be
recognized as sufficient to trigger long-term resident status. The Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) is authorized to determine whether parties have entered into marriage in good faith. as
opposed to doing so in order to obtain an immigration benefit. no
This task admittedly is difficult and perhaps even controversial in
some cases. When there is no formal marriage. it is even more vexing
and problematic. If a partner could obtain a benefit without assuming the obligations of marriage. the INS likely would receive many
more applications than it does now. The agency would have to scrutinize every relationship intensively and pass judgment on whether the
partners possessed sufficient commitment to one another to justify
favorable immigration treatment. This would create the prospect of
inconsistent" and unpredictable outcomes that could well undermine
the perceived fairness and integrity. of the immigration laws.
A similar concern arises in deciding whether cohabitors should
be able to invoke the privilege for confidential communications that is
now available to spouses in civil and criminal proceedings. The pri\ilege protects from disclosure any communication during marriage between the parties that they intended to remain confidential. even after
the marriage is over.Ill On the one hand. respect for intimate relationships suggests that the state should not attempt to force disclosure
of such communications in a legal proceeding. Intrusion on the privacy of committed, unmarried partners may be just as damaging as
infringement on the privacy of spouses. This suggests that the underlying substance of the relationship. rather than its form. should be the
basis for protection.
Given the possibility that this privilege might reduce the prospect
of civil or criminal liability. however, the number of cohabitors who
would attempt to invoke it could be substantial. This would be problematic for two reasons. First, the court would have to conduct an indepth inquiry into every unmarried relationship that is asserted as the
basis for the privilege. As with a case-by-case inquiry by immigration
officials, this would increase the probability of contradictory and unpredictable decisions. The ramifications of this may be especially seri-

ous, because inconsistent exclusion of evidence could erode
confidence in the ability of the legal system to arrive at just decisions.
A second, and related, point is that evidentiary privileges are intended to be a narrow exception to the rule that a tribunal should
110 See 8 U.S.C. § 1255(e}(3) (Supp. V 1999).
111 See Milton C. Regan,Jr., Spousal Prit1ilcge and tJle Meanings of Mtmiag~ 81 V,\. 1..
REv. 2045, 2055-56 (1995).
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have access to all relevant information. Making the communications
privilege available to unmarried partners would significantly expand
the body of evidence that potentially could be withheld from the legal
system. An individual would be able not only to invoke the privilege
with respect to the relationship in which he or she is currently involved, but also to shield communications that occurred during earlier relationships as well. The relevant figure for estimating the
potential impact of extending the privilege to cohabitors thus would
not be simply the percentage of the population cohabiting at a particular time, but the percentage who have ever cohabited. For these reasons, it seems inadvisable to extend the privilege to unmarried
partners.
Another right currently available to spouses, but not cohabitors,
is the ability to sue for loss of consortium in the event of a negligent
injury to one's partner. This tort is meant to provide compensation
for "loss of conjugal society, comfort, affection, companionship and
sexual relatlons."112 A partner in an unmarried, committed relationship obviously can suffer such loss just as much as a marital partner.
Furthermore, unlike the other benefits I have discussed, such as tax
exemption, health insurance, immigration status, and evidentiary privilege, an unmarried partner attempting to assert this cause of action
does not have the option at the time she seeks the benefit of obtaining
it simply by marrying. Finally, just as I have suggested that financial
reliance by a cohabitor justifies receipt of benefits in certain cases, so
one might argue that emotional reliance supports the right to assert a
claim for the loss of companionship by an unmarried partner. Law, in
other words, should try to limit the vulnerability that arises from intimate interdependence.
On the other hand, an important concern of tort law is to establish reasonable limits on the persons to whom a negligent defendant
owes a duty. As a result, "[t]he need to draw a bright line in this area
of the law is essential,"1l3 lest persons be subject to liability to an expansive group of claimants who are not entirely foreseeable. Marriage
obviously provides such a bright line. The proportion of people who
are married at any given time is considerably higher than those who
cohabit, which makes it relatively foreseeable that one who injures an
adult will also cause injury to the victim's spouse. In addition, the
possibility of obtaining substantial damages could substantially increase the number of claims. This, of course, would require more
frequent case-by-case analysis of the emotional significance and dura112 Elden v. Sheldon, 758 P.2d 582,588 (Cal. 1988).
113

fd.
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bility of intimate non-marital relationships. Finally, one might contend that preserving this cause of action for spouses directly expresses
the message that marriage is a distinctive relationship that ideally involves the highest degree of commitment.
The arguments on each side of this issue are strong ones, which
makes its resolution especially difficult. One way to give some weight
to each may be to preserve a loss of consortium claim for spouses, but
to permit an unmarried partner who witnesses injury to his or her
companion to bring an action for negligent infliction of emotional
distress. This would be consistent with the expansion in recent years
of the class of persons authorized to bring a lawsuit. New Jersey, for
instance, has recognized a cause of action for distress for an engaged
partner who was present at the death of her fiance. 114 This "bystander" liability is narrower than liability for the loss of consortium,
since the claimant must witness the injury in question.ll!i By contrast,
a spouse who sues for loss of consortium is presumed to have suffered
injury simply by virtue of the fact that her marital partner has been
injured or killed, regardless of whether she was present at the
event. ll6 Viewed from the legal fiction of foreseeability, it is reasonably foreseeable that a defendant who injures someone who is with a
companion will also cause emotional distress to that companion. particularly given the growing ranks of cohabiting partners. It is far more
foreseeable, however, that someone who injures an unaccompanied
person will also inflict uyury on an absent spouse than on an absent
unmarried partner.
III.

DOMESTIC PARTNER REGISTRATION

I have suggested with respect to some benefits that the difficulty
and unpredictability of case-by-case identification of eligible domestic
partners is one factor that militates against e.xtension of spousal benefits to cohabitors. One way to avoid this problem would be to permit
unmarried couples to register as domestic partners if they "ished to
be treated comparably to spouses for certain purposes. Some jurisdictions make certain public benefits available to couples who register. 117
Others furnish registration only as a step that may qualify partners for
some private benefits, such as coverage under private employer health
insurance policies. I IS
114
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117
118

Dunphy v. Gregor, 642 A.2d 372,380 (NJ. 1994).
See id.
See Conen, supra note 13, at 341.
Ill.
See id.
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Treating registration as a device simply to obtain rights and bene~
fits, without any corresponding responsibilities, is at odds with the
idea that domestic partners warrant some degree of special treatment,
because they are committed to one another. Furthermore, it seems
likely that at least some persons would register who would not deserve
such favorable treatment, since registering would have no disadvantages, because it triggers no oblig'ltions.
One way to address this concern would be to provide that domestic partners who register would receive some, but not all, of the benefits of marriage and would be subject to some, but not all, of the
responsibilities that spouses assume. Couples who desire a more lim~
ited commitment than marriage would be able to take advantage of
this alternative. Registration would reflect a more explicit willingness
to assume the status of cohabitor, in contrast to courts' current tendency to infer such an agreement from the conduct of the parties. 1H1
One might argue that this system would take account of couples' varying degrees of commitment and would provide a more predictable
legal regime governing intimate relationships than we now have.
Rather than maintaining a dichotomy between married and unmarried couples, law would offer a menu of choices that gives partners
greater choice over the terms of their relationships.
There are, however, at least a couple of concerns about this arrangement. First, it would effectively revive explicit contract as the
basis for the rights and duties of cohabitors. While registration does
not carry some of the negative connotations that contract does in the
context of intimate relationships, partners who register nonetheless
would be entering into an agreement that provided for enforceable
rights and duties with respect to one another and third parties. Yet, as
the ALI has observed, even as courts formally invoke the doctrine of
contract, in substance they tend to rely on general equitable principles in adjudicating claims between unmarried partners. 120 Such flexibility is valuable in light of the fact that not all forms of vulnerability
and reliance can be explicitly anticipated in advance. Responsibilities
and expectations can arise from interdependence, not simply from
voluntary agreement, and will vary according to the course of a relationship whose trajectory necessarily will be uncertain. If domestic
partners must register in order to ellioy any rights or obligations,
many deserving individuals will be left without recourse. If some
claims will be recognized even in the absence of registration, then a
119
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See supra text accompanying notes 52-71.
See ALI PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft 2000), supra note 1, § 6.03 cmt. b.
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registration scheme will provide little more predictability than currently exists.
A second concern is more subtle, but not necessarily less important. Would law still be recognizing and encouraging commitment if
partners could calibrate in advance the specific benefits they e~. pect to
enjoy and the particular burdens they are willing to accept? In what
sense would it be meaningful to speak. of commitment that involves,
for instance, willingness to be responsible for emergency medical expenses of one's partner, but unwillingness to share property equitably
if the relationship ends? Commitment, in other words, may be a binary concept, at least when intimate relationships are involved. One
may speak of the absence or presence of commitment, but one does
so less easily of commitment with respect to some aspects of the relationship but not others. Marriage has such cultural resonance because it is seen as involving an open-ended pledge to share the
uncertainties of life "for better or for worse," rather than a qualified
promise to bear some risks but not others.
To be sure, few if any partners can live up to this ideal. The exigencies of daily life and the frailties of human beings inevitably constrain our ability to realize it. Acknowledging that these practical
obstacles will almost certainly arise, however, is different from specifYing at the outset that there are limits on the commitment that one is
willing to make. Marriage may be valuable as a "regulative ideal," an
aspiration that shapes purposive activity, even if that activit}' never
fully fu1fills the aspiration that animates it. 1!!1 Will marriage continue
to serve this function if it is one option among many on a menu of
legally recognized intimate relationships?
IV.

SAME-SEX COUPLES

As I noted at the outset, my discussion of the legal treatment of
unmarried couples is based on the premise that marriage should be
extended to same-sex couples. In the absence of this step, laws treating same-sex domestic partners similarly to spouses may be a reasonable way to acknowledge both that gays and lesbians may be involved in
committed relationships and that there is some resistance to making
marriage available to them. It is worth noting, however, that the goal
of preserving the distinctiveness of marriage and avoiding blurring its
differences with unmarried intimate relationships may in fact be
served by permitting same-sex couples to marry if they choose.
121

See generaUy DOROTHY EMMET, THE ROLE OF THE UNREALlS.WLE: A SruD\' IN REGIDEALS (1994) (defending reliance on regulative ideals as a \'alliable fonn of
moral standard).
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First, some of the impetus for the enactment of domestic partner
legislation has been a desire to provide at least a measure of legal
recognition for committed same-sex relationships. 122 Some provisions
that extend benefits to both same-sex and opposite-sex domestic partners may well reflect the fear that failure to include the latter group
may prompt a legal challenge. If marriage were available to gays and
lesbians, some, although not all, of the pressure for domestic partner
legislation might abate. All intimate couples who wished to make a
significant commitment to one another would be able to marry.
States could then reasonably assume that unmarried couples generally
represented those partners who did not wish to make such a commitment. While it would be appropriate to provide some legal benefits to
such couples in accordance with the analytical framework that I have
suggested, there might be less insistence on fully comparable treatment of married and unmarried couples.
A second benefit is admittedly more speculative, but perhaps
more important. Despite elimination of most of the formal legal provisions reinforcing traditional spousal gender roles, marriage as a cultural symbol undeniably is still associated with the adoption of these
roles. Surely there are some couples who are deeply committed to
one another who nonetheless are wary of marrying, because they see it
as entry into a patriarchal institution kept alive by social expectations.

If same-sex couples were able to marry, however, there would be a
body of spouses for whom gender could not serve as the basis for a
division of labor. Marriage, in other words, would no longer be an
exclusively gendered relationship, thereby confounding traditional
expectations that rest on this feature. 123 This severance could well
change the cultural meaning of marriage, investing it with a more
egaiitarian ethos. Such a development would remove what may be an
important obstacle to marriage by committed partners, thereby making even more justified legal distinctions between married and up.married couples.
CONCLUSION

I have argued that society is justified in treating marriage as a
legally privileged intimate relationship, thereby preserving a distinc122 In Vennont, of course, legislation is a response to the state supreme court's
requirement that the state find some way to make available to same-sex couples the
marital benefits that are provided to those who marry. See Baker v. State, 744 A.2d
864, 886 (Vt. 1999).
123 See Nan D. Hunter, Marriage, Law, and Gender: A Feminist Inquiry, 1 LAw & SE..,{U.
ALl'lY 9, 18-19 (1991).
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tion bet\'veen married and unmarried couples. Due regard for practiceil realities, however, supports treating marriage and cohabitation
similarly in certain circumstances. In general, these are when an individual is rendered vulnerable by virtue of her reliance on a nonmarital
relationship or wishes to express his or her commitment by assuming
responsibilities to a partner or child. If more couples cohabit, we can
expect more cases in which the law recognizes these interests. This
itself could begin to blur the perception that there is a meaningful
difference between marriage and cohabitation. If marriage involves
fewer exclusive benefits, its burdens may seem more pronounced.
Might this malse marriage appear even less desirable than
cohabitation?
. One response is that, in many cases, recognizing the claim of one
domestic partner also involves imposing a duty on the other. This is
true, for instance, with respect to financial awards at the time an unmarried couple separates. In addition, certain rights represent the
assumption of an obligation, such as the right to make medical or
other decisions on behalf of an incapacitated partner. To the extent
that rights and responsibilities are paired, the perceived distinctive
burdens of marriage may seem less.

Nonetheless, a second response is that it is precisely the greater
obligations involved in marriage that give it a special status as the preeminent expression of intimate commitment. A 'willingness to assume
burdens and responsibilities that could easily be avoided can signal a
special depth of commitment The acceptance of limits on individual
freedom, when an alternative exists that offers many benefits "ithout
such restrictions, could make marriage an even more powerful cultural symbol. What is unclear is whether this will come at the cost of
fewer marriages. Will marriage become a more potent, but less chosen, social arrangement?
Perhaps. To try to prevent this by resolutely refusing to provide
any legal benefits to cohabitors, however, seems misguided. First, it
would result in hardship in many cases. Furthermore, it is by no
means certain that this would discourage cohabitation and encourage
marriage. The dramatic increase in cohabitation in recent decades
has come during a period in which legal benefits have been made
available haltingly arid inconsistently. The social practice of cohabitation seems to have placed increasing pressure on the law, rather than
law prompting changes in behavior.
This suggests that preserving the legal distinctiveness of marriage
may have an ambiguous impact On the one hand, couples may be
only vaguely familiar with the legal rights and duties that accompany
marriage when they make decisions about their relationships. This
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suggests that different legal treatment of marriage and cohabitation
may have little effect on the choices of intimate partners. At the same
time, marriage remains the most significant symbol of commitment to
a shared intimate life between adults. As a cultural icon, it may be
more powerful than ever. Eliminating all or most legal distinctions
between it and cohabitation could begin to erode that symbolic roleeven though the ability to describe precisely how this might happen is
maddeningly elusive.
.
Marriage and cohabitation ultimately should evoke considerable
humility for those attempting to trace the intricate connections
among law, culture, and behavior. This is an area in which grand pro·
noun cements and categorical approaches are less useful than aware·
ness of the limits of rationality and appreciation of "tlle crooked
timber of humanity."124 Perhaps more than any other dimension of
life, intimate relationships remind us that what we care about most
may be hardest to attain by design. Yet, the very importance of those
relationships makes it seem unthinkable not to try. In the end, we are
left with the paradox that Karl Llewellyn described so well: "Law
means so pitifully little to life. Life is so terrifyingly dependent on tlle
law." 125
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See generaUy

ISAIAH BERLIN, THE CROOKED TIMBER OF HUMANItr. CI-IAl'TE.HS IN

(1991) (suggesting in various essays that there is no single
human way oflife superior to all others).
125 Karl N. Llewellyn, What Price Contract?-AnEssay in Perspective, 40 YALE LJ. 704,
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